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Abstract 
The primary issue to be addressed in this paper is to offer a cognitive linguistics 
analysis of the language used to and about children in the judicial system of 
England and Wales, as well as the reports of such cases in UK media. An ongoing 
issue for the treatment of children has been how they are questioned by the police 
and in court. In our earlier research, as well as that of other forensic researchers, a 
number of outdated, social myths persevere in rape cases involving both adults and 
children. These myths include the ‘Rape Myth’ and the ‘Autonomous Testosterone 
Myth’, but for children also include other adverse, expected patterns of behaviour, 
such as a general expectation that ‘children lie’, ‘children cannot differentiate truth 
from fiction’, and ‘children are easily confused about other people’s intentions’. 
In this paper, we first offer a review of the legal process in England and Wales 
involving children, before illustrating how the above myths and expectations are 
triggered by the questions put to witnesses. This analysis will show how these 
associations, which are part of each person’s encyclopaedic knowledge in the form 
of conceptual frames and ICMs, are networked in elaborate semantic fields that 
potentially trigger inferential information that can prejudice hearers (such as jurors 
and media readers) against those same child victims.  
 
  
1. Introduction 
In the 1980’s and 90’s, researchers identified a particular, adverse representation of rape 
victims that emerged from the questions put to them in court: the so-called, ‘Rape’ myth 
(Aldeer 1987; Matoesian 1993; Ehrlich 2001). More recently, we put forward the 
‘Autonomous Testosterone’ myth, which complements the earlier, rape myth (Aldridge 
& Luchjenbroers 2007, 2008, 2011; and Luchjenbroers & Aldridge 2007, 2013) in that 
it offers an explanation of how men have been characterized as ‘victims’ of a woman’s 
allure only to find themselves accused of rape. Although these myths were not analysed 
in cognitive linguistics terms, they nevertheless capture, in part, the conceptual frames 
that have been used to generate adverse, representations of rape/ sexual assault victims 
in the legal process across countries. Of further, particular interest to us is the relevance 
of these adverse representations to the treatment of children in court, who are legally 
beneath the age of ‘consent’. In this paper we consider the questions put to children in 
cognitive linguistics terms (conceptual frames and ICMs) in order to gain insight into 
the conceptual underpinnings of these myths/representations that add to the difficulties 
even children have in achieving justice in court. We also consider whether these 
representations are still apparent in recent media reports of rape cases, which can offer 
some explanation of the continued use of these representations despite attempts by UK 
legal process to combat these prejudices. 
 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMES and ICMs 
Fundamental to the ‘cognitive linguistics’ approach to language production and 
comprehension is the assumption that word, sentence, and discourse meanings draw on 
conceptualizations that are shaped by personal experience. There is a huge body of 
research from linguistics, as well as Philosophy (cf. Minsky 1975a, b), Psychology (cf. 
Johnson 1987/2013), and Artificial Intelligence (cf. Schank and Abelson 1977) that 
have evidenced continuities between language and experience. In this way, the use of a 
word is tailored by the user’s field of experience, which determines when the use of a 
word may be deemed appropriate, but also how a network of expectations are triggered 
when the concepts related to those words are accessed. For example, the English word 
bachelor, if defined simply as an ‘unmarried man’, is somehow inappropriate in 
reference to the Pope, Moslem men with three wives (but allowed four), or divorcees 
(Lakoff 1983, 1987). This is because the essence of ‘eligibility’ and ‘inclination’ to 
marry is part of the concept even though the minimalist definition does not explain 
these assumptions. Similarly, for us this concept also triggers presumptions of 
‘reasonable affluence’, meaning that a homeless man in his 50s is unlikely to be referred 
to as a bachelor, even though he well may be an ‘unmarried man’. Hence, this 
encyclopaedic approach to meaning clarifies how different language users may include  
different presumptions for the appropriate use of a word, like bachelor, drawing on their 
own experiences in society.  
In this way, Fillmore’s work on ‘conceptual frames’ captures more than just the 
prototypical, narrow sense of a given word, but also the prototypical context of it’s use, 
making additional associations available when a word triggers a particular concept (cf.	
Fillmore 1975, 1977, 1982, 1985). For example, Fillmore’s well known ‘restaurant 
frame’ (1982) immediately makes associated information conceptually ‘available’ 
without the need for expressed, lexical reference – see (1) below:  
(1) I had a sandwich at the university canteen. 
The speaker would not need to additionally convey that the sandwich had been paid for, 
or that payment preceded consumption, as the speaker’s understanding of how canteens 
work (in the UK) will trigger that information for possible reference should further 
discourse require it, such as in (2) below: 
(2) It wasn’t what they said it, was so I got a refund. 
So, together with an expectation that other members of the same community of practice 
would have access to the same or a very similar pattern of experience, the user’s 
conceptual frame of ‘University canteens’ would provide the component of ‘payment 
before consumption’, bridging the gap between examples (1) and (2). In effect, frames 
capture the body of social expectations (not just personal expectations) associated with 
each lexical choice, and these expectations might not be lexically apparent. Hence this 
conceptual network of additional information would complement the information 
provided lexically and would influence the comprehender’s understanding of the 
discourse they are exposed to. 
Hence, the conceptual frames approach to word senses captures associations with 
related information in memory, drawn from the users’ experience. Similarly, Lakoff 
(1987) proposed that different contextual uses of a given word, sometimes cohere into a 
more general, conceptual representation, called an ‘Idealised Cognitive Model’ (or 
ICM). An ICM captures the full set of social expectations associated with the concept 
triggered by a particular word. For example, the various uses of the English word, 
‘mother’ draw on a range of different social (component) models, including: working 
mother or housewife mother, birth mother, adoptive mother, surrogate mother, real 
mother, child mother, etc. Lakoff explained that these examples capture the range of 
potential associations triggered by the word ‘mother’.  
In effect, the ICM captures separate elements (or ‘models’) of what American 
society generally associates with the concept of a ‘mother’ -- i.e., she is a mature 
woman (and not too young), who would produce the egg, that is fertilized by the father, 
who she is married to; She might work but also might stay at home; she would carry the 
foetus full term to birth; and is the primary caretaker. Essentially, this is the prototype 
for this word; although not all uses match the prototype perfectly. In in today’s society, 
many instances of ‘mother’ exist that do not utilize every expected component of this 
ICM, but possibly just a subset (e.g., an adoptive mother is legally the mother, who 
might stay at home or go out to work, and she is the primary caretaker, but she did not 
have the child in utero and bear it, and might not have been inseminated by the married 
father. Such component models are drawn from the more general ICM, which enables 
us to understand non-prototypical cases, such as given in (3) below:  
(3) My third foster mum is the only real mother I have ever known. 
Even though for many users, a ‘real mother’ is also the ‘birth mother’, we can make 
sense of (3) by drawing on one particular component model from the more general 
ICM: the primary caretaker mother. It is also clear from (3) that the ‘caretaker’ 
component is held here more highly than other component features, even though others 
may have a different perception of what makes a ‘real’ mother. In effect, a person’s 
ICM reflects the sum of that individual’s social expectations concerning a given concept 
triggered by a particular word, and instances of use are measured against those general 
expectations (Lakoff 1990). From this perspective, words do not need to fit the world, 
but instead, fit our ICMs of what we expect to find in it.   
In our research, conceptual frames and ICMs are used in the analysis of the 
language produced in legal settings in cases of rape and/or sexual assault. The 
importance of a complete linguistic analysis of not just the language used but the 
conceptual mappings that would follow from the lawyers’ choices (or media’s choices) 
of language is paramount, as in cases such as these the information provided in the 
victim’s account may be the only evidence available. The following section will offer 
some background into the legal system of England and Wales, leading to the myths 
recognised in earlier works, before dealing with the adverse representations of children 
generated by specific ICMs, triggered by lawyer questioning. 
 
3.  LANGUAGE in the LEGAL PROCESS 
In England and Wales, a number of witness types have been identified as particularly 
disadvantaged in the legal process. These witnesses include  ‘vulnerable’ witnesses 
(such as children under the age of consent) and ‘intimidated’ witnesses (such as rape 
victims and those involved with violent crimes). In order to redress this disadvantage, a 
number of ‘special measures’ have been introduced to improve these witnesses’ 
performance in the initial police interview and in court (alleged victims not perpetrators 
of crime), to better enable them to give an accurate and coherent testimony (cf. Home 
office 1992, 2000, 2002). These special measures may now include: a visual barrier in 
court between the victim and the defendant/perpetrator; being cross-examined via 
video-link to a different location; and/or the initial police interview with the victim 
being videoed and offered in court as the victim’s Examination-in-Chief, in lieu of 
direct questioning by the prosecution barrister. Each of these measures need to first be 
granted by the trial judge in each case where any or all of these measures may be 
denied.  
A significant problem for victims with this procedure is that the videoed, police 
interview must serve two objectives: (i) to inform the CPS (Crime Prosecution Service) 
of all possible aspects of an alleged crime, the basis of which they can decide whether to 
pursue a case in court; and (ii) represent the victim’s case in court. This is problematic 
because the police interview involves questions that are not allowed in open court, such 
as questions regarding the victim’s sexual history. Unfortunately, the police need to 
investigate both the (alleged) crime and the victim as thoroughly as possible which 
results in questions to the victim that are not necessarily victim-friendly. In essence, the 
police-video, if given as the victim’s Examination-in-Chief, includes questioning that 
may also challenge the victim and the alleged crime in a manner that is not likely to be 
consistent with how a prosecution barrister would question their claimant (cf. Aldridge 
& Luchjenbroers 2008; Luchjenbroers & Aldridge 2013). In essence, the victim’s case, 
her choices, her character and her past are investigated in her Examination-in-Chief (by 
the police), making the pursuit of all these issues also open to Cross-Examination by the 
Defense. Even though the statistics for children’s prosecutorial success is not calculated 
separately from adult claimants in England and Wales, after years of ‘special measures’, 
the overall success of conviction in rape cases is repeatedly reported around 5-6%,1 and 
most cases (roughly three-quarters) never make it to trial. 
As problematic as the use of the videoed, police interview in court is for child 
witnesses, a far more problematic issue for rape victims (whether adult or child) is that 
in many cases, the verbal testimony of the victim may be the only type of evidence 
available. Added to this is a potentially low linguistic maturity among some child 
witnesses in terms of, (i) an inability to properly narrate what has happened to them; (ii) 
an insufficient knowledge of the lexical descriptions for sexual activity as produced by 
the police or in court; and (iii) a poor ability to answer questions that would caste 
themselves in a more prodigious light. Essentially, children often lack the linguistic 
skills necessary to recognise whether the questions put to them by the police or in court, 
are victim friendly or not; and if they do recognise the questions as potentially hostile, 
they are often powerless to respond in a way that will improve jurors’ perceptions of 
themselves. 
For example, when a 10 year old boy in a physical abuse case was asked, “Are you 
the kind of lad who runs away from a fight or an argument?”(Aldridge & Luchjenbroers 
2007). A ‘yes’ would require the boy to declare himself a coward, as ‘coward’ is trigged 
by a frame based recognition that ‘running away from a fight’ (from a threat) is 
something that only a coward would do. So, of course the boy answers ‘No’, seemingly 
oblivious that his answer also accepts that he would ‘stand up to … an argument’ which 
could instead trigger a frame of ‘bully’ or ‘trouble maker’. This was by obvious design 
by the questioning barrister as this sequence was used before subsequent questioning 
that triggered a parental frame, in order to qualify why more aggressive measures may 
have been, unavoidably or understandably, taken by the adult in this case.  
Further problems, more central to the concerns of our research, include the 
preponderance of police and barrister questions in court that dwell on both outdated and 
inappropriate social models of expected choices and behaviours in a rape/sexual assault 
situation. In such cases, however, we can expect that jurors’ prior experiences of rape or 
sexual assaults would only be by word of mouth (or the media), and not personal 
experience. Because barristers can exclude jurors, we can assume that prior experience 
will be grounds for exclusion by either the prosecution or the defense. This means that 
the nature of talk by the police, in court and in the media are relevant when 
investigating the relevant frames and ICMs used to break down whether a crime has 
occurred. In the following sections we will outline the Rape myth, followed by the 
Autonomous Testosterone myth, before turning to the nature of the questions put to 
victims and the descriptions of such cases made to the media. 
The ‘Rape’ myth 
The nature of the questions put to victims (adult or child) reveal how outdated 
assumptions persist about what type of person can be a ‘true’ victim of rape. These 
stereotypical assumptions include that ‘she’ is a decent, married woman (so her sexual 
needs would be satisfied elsewhere), who offers no advances or provocation to the 
rapist whatsoever (so that he would not misunderstand her intentions), and who is 
subjected to a completely unjustified and unexpected attack, for which she would be 
able to evidence wounds due to her resistance (see also, Larcombe 1994, and Temkin 
2010). In effect, the identified features of the Rape myth cover much of what is included 
in an ICM of a ‘true’ rape, and it is this model that the legal profession in particular 
seems loathe to abandon, even though advice on the CPS website warns against the 
associated presumptions.2  
Further assumptions stemming from the ICM of a ‘true’ rape, include that ‘she’ 
would take reasonable steps to avoid a rape situation (i.e., avoid disreputable 
establishments; avoid dress and use makeup choices that might send the wrong signals; 
and she would not be provocative in her behaviours); and if in trouble, she would be 
expected to make a reasonable attempt of escape. In fact, this stereotypical image is so 
persistent that both police and barristers ask questions to alleged victims that speak to 
these prejudices. 
Hence, the word ‘Idealised’ in ICM does not mean ‘the best’ or ‘optimal’, but 
instead conveys ‘principle, in that it captures a consistent reoccurrence of features 
associated with a particular word. Even though much of the ‘rape’ ICM has been 
rejected in many circles,3 jurors are still encouraged to have certain expectations about 
what a rape is and how a ‘true’ victim would behave, and when a claimant’s case before 
them is not 100% consistent with that representation, the defense effectively conveys 
‘reasonable doubt’.  
The ‘Autonomous Testosterone’ myth 4 
This myth complements the Rape myth in that it centres on what kind of man would 
carry out such an act (or need to) and what can be expected of any man. In effect, when 
women dress provocatively, and frequent the kind of bars where sexual partners can be 
found, and/or is not wounded in the sex event (so she didn’t fight back and if there are 
scratch marks, some girls like it rough), then sex must have been consensual or ‘she 
asked for it’. This then shifts the blame in rape cases to the alleged victim who is 
portrayed as responsible for ‘luring’ an otherwise upstanding (young) man into a sexual 
situation where he is then accused of rape. More importantly, following this myth, the 
man in the sex event cannot be blamed for partaking in sex, when the behaviour and 
choices of the female indicated her willingness for sex. 
This then mixes the presumption that once aroused, a man can’t help but finish the 
deed, with the need for women to take responsibility for luring a man into that position. 
Therefore, he would be justified in believing that this partner was both willing and 
actively pursuing sex, if she sent out those cues. As a result, any question of rape is a 
matter of (possible) miscommunication, and if so, the man in question is not a villain 
but a victim of the legal process and the accusations being made by a vindictive woman 
with other, more devious objectives (which are often not explained).  
Importantly, the ICM of a ‘rapist’ is actively cultivated as someone who is 
otherwise unknown, single and not so young, and would be visibly ‘dangerous’, so that 
anyone could avoid being a victim by avoiding anyone filling all these criteria. The 
consequence of this position is that a victim who dress like her peers or famous people 
in magazines; and behaves in a manner typical of her peers; and frequents the same 
establishments as her peers, is then blamed for those same decisions. In fact, it is hard to 
imagine a situation today where otherwise typical behaviour and choices might not be 
argued as inviting sex.  
Children ‘lie’, ‘are easily confused’, and ‘can’t differentiate fact from fiction’ 
Further presumptions impacting children in the legal process have also been 
documented by Luchjenbroers and Aldridge (2007, 2013; and Aldridge & 
Luchjenbroers 2007). These are frequently triggered or said outright in trials with 
children, such as (4) and (5) below.  
(4) I want to suggest to you that you’re making that little bit up, C. Do you 
understand? That’s not true, is it?  
In this sexual assault case, the barrister relies heavily on the suggestion that the child 
may be confused by the questioning (Do you understand) as well as the assertion that 
the child is lying. To what end, however, is not explored or explained.  
(5) Tell us how the game worked …. Did he touch your nose? 
In (5), the 12 year old girl in a sexual assault case is questioned about the defendant’s 
prior activities that involved play. Although the child claimed that the event in question 
went beyond play, the child is portrayed as confused about this defendant’s behaviours, 
and the defendant is portrayed as an upstanding, innocent man. The barrister later 
asserts to the witness that anything sexual was confusion and a lie. 
The specific research question to be addressed in this paper is to calculate how the 
underlying conceptual frames and metaphors triggered by questions put to children in 
the legal process can prejudice against those same children and/or their actions. In 
addition, we will also consider these frames in media reports of rape/sexual assault 
trials. 
 
4.   DATA 
Child Data  
The material used in this paper is drawn from a data bank of police and court transcripts 
from ca. 2000, involving sexual and physical assault cases with children from between 
three and fourteen years of age. The extracts included in this paper are from the official 
transcripts taken from videotaped interviews and those taken from the Cross-
Examination phase of courtroom interactions. Throughout, “P” is the policeman/woman 
and “C” is the child witness, and “B” is the questioning barrister in court. 
Particular features of these testimonies from children include that they have 
significant difficulty in (i) providing an account that is frame consistent and (ii) making 
appropriate, strategic choices about what to convey and what to withhold. We have been 
concerned with the questions put to child witnesses concerning their sexual history, and 
to what extent these questions ‘normalise’ sex between adults and minors.  
Rape case Reports given in the Media  
In addition to the child data we will also consider a range of media reports made by 
judges, barristers and others involved in rape cases. We also consider these in terms of 
the conceptual frames and ICMs discussed in the cases involving children. 
 
5.  Police and Barrister Questioning 
In these analyses, a number of ‘rape’ ICM components have emerged in the questioning 
of the children in our data. The first, prominent in the police questioning of a 14 year 
old girl, is the notion that prior sexual experience in a child rape case, such as (6) below. 
(6) “P”: You told me earlier on you were on the game or had been on the game  
“C”: I’ve never been on the game  
“P”: Never been on the game?  
“C”: I have never taken money for sex, ever  
As the age of consent in the UK is 16 and (if the accused is convicted) a matter of  
‘statutory rape’, the issue of consent is used in court for sentencing where a victim (i.e., 
child’s) consent is looked upon as a ‘mitigating’ factor. The court’s reasoning is that in 
such sex events, there is no force so the event would be less damaging for the child. 
There are many problems with this line of questioning: (i) a witness’s prior sexual 
history may not be asked in court but is brutally questioned here; (ii) prior sexual 
history has no bearing on whether this was either rape or statutory rape; (iii) this is the 
video recorded police interview that would be shown in court as the victim’s 
Examination-in-chief but the questions sooner resemble what would be expected of the 
more hostile, Cross-examination; (iv) because sexual history has been raised in the 
Examination-in-chief, it is open to further scrutiny in the defense’s Cross-examination; 
and (v) physical wounds are not the only kind of trauma that can result from a sexual 
assault. The legal profession’s focus on sexual history is also captured in (7) below. 
(7) “P”: Have you ever done anything like that with anyone else before?  
“C”: No.  
“P”: Has anyone ever fingered you before?  
“C”: No.  
“P”: So, that was your first sexual encounter was it?  
What these questions capture is not only that children who are legally below the 
age of consent are questioned for evidence of consent, but for explicit details of their 
prior sexual history that has no bearing on the case under investigation, other that to 
assess whether the alleged victim is a ‘true’ victim. Essentially this suggests that 
evidence of prior sexual experience will diminish the claim of being raped, and also 
reinforces the rape ICM of a true victim as a chaste female. Drawing then on the ‘rape’ 
ICM (as captured by the Rape myth) only a child with no prior sexual experience (or 
adult women with little or no sexual history) can be a ‘true’ victim; and (as captured by 
the  Autonomous Testosterone myth) a woman with prior sexual history must be seen as 
sufficiently, sexually provocative as to lure an unwitting man into a sex act. 
Unfortunately the focus on a child’s sexual history (if there is one) entirely looses sight 
of the legal fact that in England and Wales, girls under 16 cannot consent to sex. 
Therefore, they are all victims of statutory rape; and any argument that sex with a 
sexually aware child isn't so bad, or not rape essentially argues that abusing the alreay 
abused is okay.  
Further attributes of the Rape myth include the alleged victim’s conduct, dress and 
other choices during the event in question, such as (8) through (12) below. 
(8) “C”: so I did and em and he started kissing me, started biting me again then he 
started ... [silence] 
 “P”: When it was happening, was the boat dark? 
The police question appears odd in the context of the child’s narrative. The relevance of 
this question must therefore draw on the predictability of the alleged rapist’s intent, if 
the lights were off. If the room is dark then sexual advances might be predicted and a 
true victim would have tried to escape (at least sooner than this child had done, despite 
being on a boat).  
The following two examples draw on the alleged victim’s choices concerning dress, 
thus drawing on the frame-based associations that a ‘true’ victim would dress 
appropriately and avoid dangerous circumstances where an attack might be preempted. 
Example (10) also comes from an attempted rape case involving an 11 year old boy. 
 (9) “P”: Can you tell me what you were wearing last night? 
 “C”: I was wearing my cream Reebok jumper and my check shirt and my blue jeans 
and my trainers 
 “P”: OK, did you have anything on underneath your shirt? 
(10) “P”: Alright OK. So it’s a normal double bed is it?  
“C”: [nods]  
“P”: What were you wearing? 
“C”: my pyjamas 
The following two examples draw on additional assumptions from the Rape myth 
regarding a ‘true’ victim’s choices regarding how much to drink (11) and how hard she 
will fight an attacker off, leaving wounds as evidence (12).  
(11) “P”: Going back to when you were on the boat, how much of the brandy did you 
think you had? 
“C”: just half a mouthful 
 “C”: What about cigarettes? Did you have a cigarette on the boat? 
 (12) “P”: OK so what are your injuries as a result of last night? 
In addition, the Autonomous Testosterone myth was also clearly evident in these 
testimonies. The questions above relating to the child’s state of dress bare on this myth 
(cf. 9-10), as do questions concerning the witness (regardless of age and experience) 
being responsible for ‘reading’ the scene for possible threats (cf. 8 and 13 below). These 
examples illustrate how the child is held responsible for properly reading the situation. 
If we assume that she had understood, then she was consenting and this wasn’t rape; 
and if she didn’t want sex, then she failed to alert the man properly 
(miscommunication). 
(13) “P”: Yeah OK, what was he wearing?  
Added to these are police and barrister questions or assertions that convey that the 
child is either lying or is confused, such as (14) below. These involve a characterization 
of the defendant as an otherwise upstanding individual who cannot be guilty of such a 
crime. In this case the 10 year old witness holds firm to having been hit as well as 
others in the household having been hit. Nevertheless the barrister dismisses them all, 
and it is unclear in the child’s final contribution in this extract whether she contradicts 
the barrister’s assertion or accepts them. 
(14) “B”: Was it your mum who told you that XXX had hit (your sister)?  
“C”: No because I seen all of that in my mum’s room  
“B”: Are you sure?  
“C”: Yes.  
 “B”: Has Nicola said to you “Well, XXX hit me”?  
“C”: No, I have tried to ask her things about it, but she says that she didn’t want to 
talk about it.  
“B”: I see. Because XXX didn’t hit (your sister), did he?  
“C”: When?  
“B”: When you told us that he did hit her, he didn’t really hit her, did he?  
“C”: he did  
“B”: And he didn’t hit you either, did he?  
“C”: Yes  
The ultimate importance of these myths and the presumptions that jurors are invited 
to draw regarding the alleged victim and/or the alleged rapist in a particular case is that 
failure of some or any of the component features of these conceptual representations 
diminishes a claimant’s case and therefore the likelihood of conviction, which current 
trail statistics uphold. As jurors are directed to only find a defendant guilty “in the 
absence of reasonable doubt” being able to show in court that a claimant who appears, 
under questioning, to be a ‘normal’ sexual being who likes to be admired and thought of 
as attractive, possibly ‘sexy’ can offer the court ‘reasonable doubt’ with just a 
suggestion that she ‘might’ have wanted sex all along.  
Even though the rape ICM and its component elements that capture what 
characteristics are expected of a ‘true’ rapist and what characteristics are expected of a 
‘true’ victim, these have involved false associations that society at large have 
condemned. In particular, adult standards of behavior are extended to children under 13 
years of age, who do not always have the social expertise to always know how to act. 
Although we might assume that children of this age would be chaste, if they aren’t it 
would only prove that they’ve been previously abused, which should increase their 
vulnerability (not decrease it). Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the court’s 
thinking as it imposes lesser fines on the perpetrators in such cases. Similarly a child’s 
dress seems an unfair barometer, such as the child who wears pajamas to bed, or the girl 
who may or may not wear something under her shirt and jeans. None of these can 
provide evidence for or against rape/sexual assault of a minor and yet in these cases the 
police must deal with these questions (sometimes apologizing to the child for doing so). 
The only possible relevance is to assess the child’s case by assessing her, her actions 
and behaviours. 
The following section deals with these issues as appearing in more recent media 
sources. The data used above could be dated as one can reasonably expect proceedings 
to have changed in the 17 or so years since those cases. However, the media reports 
suggest that very little has changed in that time. 
	
Current	representations	of	Rape	and	‘consent’	appearing	in	the	Media	
Chief Crown Prosecutor for London, A.	Saunder	recently	wrote:  "For	too	long	society	has	blamed	rape	victims	for	confusing	the	issue	of	consent	-	by	drinking	or	dressing	provocatively	for	example	-	but	it	is	not	they	who	are	confused,	it	is	society	itself	and	we	must	challenge	that.	Consent	to	sexual	activity	is	not	a	grey	area	-	in	law	it	is	clearly	defined	and	must	be	given	fully	and	freely.” (DPP,	Alison	Sander	2015) Unfortunately	‘consent’	is	not	at	all	clear	among	legal	professionals	or	lay	people,	and	remains	a	grey	area.	Compounding	these	problems	are	media	reports,	which	surely	 influence	 if	not	 school	 the	public	about	 rape	 situations,	 and	which	 largely	perpetuate	 the	 rape	 and	 autonomous	 testosterone	 myths	 identified	 in	 earlier	research	(cf.	Aldridge	&	Luchjenbroers	2007,	2011;	Benedict	1992;	Ehrlich	2001;	Franiuk	et	al.,	2008;	Luchjenbroers	&	Aldridge	2007,	2013;	Matoesian	1993).	For	example,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 victim	 is	 to	 blame	 headlined	 again	 in	 2013	 when	Barrister	 Barbara	 Hewson	wrote	 in	 Spiked	magazine	 that	 Operation	 Yewtree	 (a	police	investigation	into	alleged	sexual	abuse,	predominantly	the	abuse	of	children,	by	 the	British	media	personality	 Jimmy	Saville	 and	others)	 is	 in	 fact	 engaged	 in:	"The	persecution	of	old	men".	Even	though	Saville	was	in	his	70’s,	so	an	‘old	man’,	
this	characterises	 the	case	against	him	as	a	pointless	activity	and	diminishes	any	responsibility	for	past	actions.	Barrister	Hewson	also	continues:	"Touching	a	17-year-old's	breast,	kissing	a	13-year-old,	or	putting	one's	hand	up	 a	 16-year-old's	 skirt"	 are	 not	 crimes	 comparable	 to	 gang	 rapes	 and	murders	and	"anyone	suggesting	otherwise	has	lost	touch	with	reality”.		Rather	than	denouncing	the	behaviour	of	the	men’s	actions,	Hewson	calls	for	the	lowering	 of	 the	 age	 of	 consent	 to	 13.	 This	 is	 surely	 a	worrying	 comment	 from	a	Barrister	 as	 it	 overlooks	whether	 children	as	 young	as	13	have	 the	 capacity	 and	freedom	to	consent	–	the	whole	premise	of	the	law	in	the	first	place.	Similarly,	the	following	quote	by	Nick	Ross	adds:	"Half	 of	 all	women	who	 have	 had	 penetrative	 sex	 unwillingly	 do	 not	 think	they	were	raped,	and	this	proportion	rises	strongly	when	the	assault	involves	a	boyfriend,	or	if	the	woman	is	drunk	or	high	on	drugs:	they	went	too	far,	it	wasn't	 forcible,	 they	 didn't	 make	 themselves	 clear.	 For	 them,	 rape	 isn't	always	 rape	 and	 however	 upsetting	 they	 feel,	 this	 is	 a	 long	 way	 removed	from	being	systematically	violated	or	snatched	off	the	street.""	(Ross	2013)	Ross	starts	with	a	characterisation	of	rape	as	‘not	rape’,	so	evidently	‘no	big	deal’,	followed	 by	 a	 long	 abandoned	 feature	 of	 the	 Rape	myth,	 that	 rape	 is	 only	 ‘true’	rape	when	committed	by	a	stranger,	who	attacked	unexpectedly.	Even	though	this	appears	to	be	a	misrepresentation	of	his	views,	the	public	will	remember	the	claim	(rape	 isn’t	always	rape)	not	Ross’	explanations.	Furthermore,	 the	report	given	 in	(15)	 goes	 one	 step	 further	 and,	 consistent	 with	 the	 Autonomous	 Testosterone	myth,	blames	women	for	rape,	in	that	molesters	can	apparently	be	recognized	and	therefore	should	be	avoided,	making	the	(alleged)	victim	to	blame	for	failing	to	do	so.	
(15) In	an	interview	from	jail,	Mukesh	Singh	says	‘women	who	go	out	at	night	have	only	themselves	to	blame	if	they	attract	the	attention	of	gangs	of	male	molesters.	A	girl	is	far	more	responsible	for	rape	than	a	boy’	(March	2015). 
In (16) and (17) women who drink to excess or take drugs are “asking for it”, even 
though this state makes them incapable of giving consent to sex. The men in these cases 
is not seen as an unseen and unknown attacker, even though this state would rob women 
of any active involvement in the decision to have sex. (16) CeeLo	Green	(2014)	pleaded	no	contest	to	supplying	ecstasy	to	a	woman,	and	claimed	that	he	had	consensual	sex	with	her,	despite	her	saying	she	has	no	memory	of	the	event.	
(17) A	woman	judge	slams	drunk	rape	victims	because	juries	can’t	convict	when	women	can’t	remember	anything	about	the	attack.	http://www.bbc.co/news/uk	(The	Mail	online	2014) 
The	sum	of	the	above	media	quotes	from	persons	directly	involved	in	trying	rape	and	sexual	assault	cases	shows	a	very	worrying	development	from	more	to	substantially	less	protection	by	the	law	in	such	cases.	The	above	appears	to	argue	that	light	offences	are	no	‘biggy’	and	pursuing	old	perpetrators	pointless	as	are	alleged	victims	who	were	drunk	or	on	a	drug	high.	This	latter	point	is	extraordinary	given	the	specific	wording	of	the	law	that	holds	that	consent	can	only	be	given	when	the	recipient	is	both	willing	and	conscious.	However	all	of	these	arguments	fall	outside	the	rape	ICM	that	centres	on	what	kind	of	people	are	‘true’	victims	or	perpetrators	of	rape.	The	above	statements	are	more	driven	by	the	running	of	the	legal	system	and	best	won	cases,	which	these	types	of	scenarios	are	not.	Nevertheless,	they	give	a	green	light	to	those	who	might	chose	to	carry	out	light	offences	or	helping	future	victims	get	drunk	or	high.	In	the	examples	below	(18-23),	the	characterisations	of	a	child	as	predatory	are	not	uncommon,	but	it	is	fundamentally	flawed	by	the	overriding	premise	that	children	cannot	consent	to	sex.	As	such,	any	child	of	13	or	even	16	should	be	seen	as	a	vulnerable	child	and	victim	of	the	environment	in	which	they	had	been	raised,	instead	of	someone	who	deserved	blame	and	responsibility	for	the	situation	that	they	had	been	in.  
(18) During	cross	examination	a	barrister	stated	that	a	13	year	old	girl	was	‘predatory’	in	all	her	actions	and	sexually	experienced	(2013).	 
(19) Mowat,	a	judge	who	retired	in	2014,	deemed	that	a	13	year	old	girl	‘made	most	of	the	running’.	 
(20) In	2012	a	judge,	when	sentencing	a	49	year	old	man	for	raping	a	12	year	old	girl,	said	the	child	had	‘let	herself	down	badly,	she	consumed	far	too	much	alcohol	and	took	drugs. 
(21) In	2014	in	a	case	with	a	44	year	old	teacher	and	a	16	year	old	pupil	the	judge	said	that	the	teacher	had	violated	a	position	of	trust	but	she	accused	the	girl	of	grooming	the	teacher	‘it	was	she	who	groomed	you”. 
(22) Barrister	criticized	for	calling	child	abuse	victim	predatory.	(Available	from	http://www.bbc.co.uk	(07/08/13) 
(23) In	2013	a	judge	said	a	16	year	old	groomed	her	teacher	–	that’s	nothing.	(available	at	Http://www.the	guardian.co.uk	(2013). 	 Despite	protests	that	much	has	been	achieved	in	legal	cases	and	the	law	regarding	rape	in	general,	and	child	cases	of	sexual	assault	and	rape	in	particular,	the	above	media	extracts	illustrate	that	a	great	deal	of	work	is	still	required	for	courts	and	the	media	to	move	forward	with	the	times	to	more	accurately	relate	mainstream	social	views	and	behaviours,	rather	than	schooling	society	with	outdated	perceptions.		Essentially	despite	the	year	since	the	introduction	of	special	measures	meant	to	assist	children	in	pursuing	justice	in	the	legal	system,	not	much	
has	changed	because	the	same	rape	ICMs	are	used	in	the	questioning	of	children	by	the	police	and	in	court;	and	adult	models	of	behaviour	is	often	the	standard	held	over	children	that	they	often	cannot	meet.	Even	though	jurors	may	come	to	court	with	very	different	views,	the	possibility	of	consent	is	so	actively	pursued	by	the	questioning	by	police	and	in	court,	that	‘reasonable	doubt’	is	successfully	argued	in	many	cases,	and	if	the	defendant	is	convicted	it	is	often	for	a	lesser	crime.		
 
6.  STEPS FORWARD 
In this paper we have illustrated, through police and court extracts and subsequently 
through more recent media extracts, that the rape ICM (conceptual frame network) of 
what constitutes a ‘true’ victim and a ‘true’ rapist (also captured in the rape myth plus 
the autonomous testosterone myth) remains largely unchanged due to the permitted and 
required questions posed by different parts of the judiciary. The perceptions that 
become accessible from this ICM continue to undermine both the social understanding 
of ‘consent’ and rape victims in general, through questions that encourage hearers/ 
readers to sooner sympathize with the defendant that the (alleged) victim.  
In recent years the courts have focused their attentions on attempts to define 
‘consent’ as the solution to the poor conviction rates in such trials, but a full 
understanding of ‘consent’ remains elusive. On the basis of the material above, we 
suggest that the problem is sooner a need to promote an alterntive ICM for ‘consensual 
sex’ (for adults) as opposed to the continued reliance on the rape ICM and its 
component elements; however so far none exist as it would be highly variable and 
entirely a product of individual tastes and desires. Nevertheless it is necessary because, 
it appears to be relatively easy to show jurors that at least ‘some’ of the rape ICM 
prevail (thus reinforcing similar associations in memory), and thereby creating 
‘reasonable doubt’.  
More work is clearly needed in this domain.5 Unfortunately, the judiciary is slow to 
change, despite the speed of public opinion changes. The judiciary also needs to make 
more amendments to the questioning of child witnesses, to ensure that only questions 
that either prove or disprove rape or sexual assault (regardless of what the child was 
wearing) instead of assessing the personal choices of the child in question. 
 
 
End Notes 
 																																																								
1  David Cameron, reported by the BBC, November 12, 2007.  
2  See http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/rape.html#_05  
3  We have both taught forensic linguistics modules for many years and students of both 
genders both scoff and are appalled that these prejudices in court still persist. 
4  Most of our work on rape and sexual assaults has focused on women; however we do not 
wish to argue that victims are only female or that rapists are only male. 
																																																																																																																																																																		
5  Our work has continued in addressing the laws themselves concerning rape and minors, in 
terms of conceptual Frames and ICMs of expected network associations; as well as a small 
corpus study drawing on the social uses of the word ‘consent’. This work is nearing 
completion.  
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